« Not Tetsuo, but close. | Main | On Testing, Part 1. »

Punditry, PatchGuard, and Diversity

I, like many other members of the security community, have been thinking about the PatchGuard architecture that will be implemented in Vista for the past few weeks. I resisted blogging (erg) about it because I don't want to sound like a pompous ass, but might as well get my thoughts down on the subject rather than have them rattle around.

PatchGuard is essentially Microsoft's method for handling the volume of malware in the wild. Hooking kernel calls will become far more difficult, device drivers will have to be signed, and software that traditionally requires access to non-userland features, like firewalls and AV tools, will have to go through APIs standardized out of Redmond.

Obviously, this move raised the hackles from the traditional consumer AV organizations. Any technologic edge that one had over the other that involved interfacing with the kernel, and possibly preventing more malicious software, have been eliminated. If one of the third party vendors requires an avenue into the kernel that is not provided, they have to make a formal request to Microsoft for the API feature and wait for a subsequent Service Pack to provide it.

Normalizing access to the kernel is a "good thing" from an architecture standpoint. Microsoft can't hope to manage security threats in Windows unless it reduces the attack surface, or the number of possible entry points that can be used by an attacker. Third party vendors, however, face compression their margins as Microsoft enters the space and technological innovation in this critical area is standardized across the industry.

At face value, this leaves us with the consumer-grade security products industry on the ropes and a vastly more secure operating system, all because of interface standardization. An opposing view comes forth when we consider the issue of "software diversity". This discipline, which I spent a fair bit of time studying, asserts that populations of systems are more secure when they are "different", or do not share common faults. In non-infosec terms, this is equivalent to diversifying a financial portfolio to reduce the risk of loss associated with correlated securities. By standardizing all security software to essentially the same kernel interface, a new common fault, and a new target, is introduced. We won't know until Vista is widely deployed if the drop in diversity incurred in the standardization of security will offset the gains made by the changes made by PatchGuard.

Post a comment

(If you haven't left a comment here before, you may need to be approved by the site owner before your comment will appear. Until then, it won't appear on the entry. Thanks for waiting.)

About

This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on November 16, 2006 9:27 PM.

The previous post in this blog was Not Tetsuo, but close..

The next post in this blog is On Testing, Part 1..

Many more can be found on the main index page or by looking through the archives.

Powered by
Movable Type 3.33